When Queen Elizabeth I ascended the throne of England, in 1558, there
was much to-do about her finding a husband. The issue was debated in Parliament, and was a main topic of conversation among Englishmen of all
classes; they often disagreed as to whom she should marry, but everyone
thought she should marry as soon as possible, for a queen must have a
king, and must bear heirs for the kingdom. The debates raged on for years.
Meanwhile the most handsome and eligible bachelors in the re alm-Sir
Robert Dudley, the Earl of Essex, 


Sir Walter Raleigh-vied for Elizabeth's
hand. She did not discourage them, but she seemed to be in no hurry, and
her hints as to which man might be her favorite often contradicted each
other. In 1566, Parliament sent a delegation to Elizabeth urging her to
marry before she was too old to bear children. She did not argue, nor did
she discourage the delegation, but she remained a virgin nonetheless.
The delicate game that Elizabeth played with her suitors slowly made
her the subject of innumerable sexual fantasies and the object of cultish
worship. The court physician, Simon Forman, used his diary to describe
his dreams of deflowering her. Painters represented her as Diana and other
goddesses. The poet Edmund Spenser a'"'d others wrote eulogies to the Virgin Queen. She was referred to as "




thc world's Empresse," "that virtuous
Virgo" who rules the world and sets the stars in motion. In conversation
with her, her many male suitors would employ bold sexual innuendo, a
dare that Elizabeth did not discourage. She did an she could to stir their interest and simultaneously keep them at bay.
Throughout Europe, kings and princes knew that a marriage with Elizabeth would seal an alliance between England and any nation. The king of
Spain wooed her, as did the prince of Sweden and the archduke of Austria.
She politely refused them alt
The great diplomatie issue of Elizabeth's day was posed by the revolt
of the Flemish and Dutch Lowlands, which were then possessions of Spain.
Should England break its alliance with Spain and choose France as its main
ally on the Continent, thereby encouraging Flemish and Dutch independence? By 1570 it had come to seem that an alliance with France would be
England's wisest course. France had two eligible men of noble blood, the
dukes of Anjou and Alenc;on, brothers of the French king. Would either of
them marry Elizabeth? Both had advantages, and Elizabeth kept the hopes
of both alive. The issue simmered for years. The duke of Anjou made sev-
eral visits to England, kissed Elizabeth in public,


 even called her by pet
names; she appeared to requite his affections. Meanwhile, as she flirted
with the two brothers, a treaty was signed that sealed peace between
France and England. By 1582 Elizabeth feit she could break off the
courtship. In the case of the duke of Anjou in particular, she did so with
great relief: For the sake of diplomacy she had aHowed herself to be
courted by a man whose presence she could not stand and whom she
found physically repulsive. Once peace between France and England was
secure, she dropped the unctuous duke as politely as she could.
By this time Elizabeth was too old to bear children. She was accordingly able to live the rest of her life as she desired, and she died the Vrrgin
Queen. She left no direct heir, but mIed through a period of incomparable
peace and cultural fertility.
Interpretation
Elizabeth had good reason not to marry: She had witnessed the mistakes of
Mary Queen of Scots, her cousin. Resisting the idea of being mIed by a
woman, the Scots expected Mary to marry and marry wisely. To wed a foreigner would be unpopular; to favor any particular noble house would
open up terrible rivalries. In the end Mary chose Lord Damley, a Catholic.
In doing so she incurred the wrath of Scotland's Protestants, and endless
turmoil ensued.
Elizabeth knew that marriage can often lead to a female mler's undoing: By marrying and committing to an alliance with one party or nation,
the queen becomes embroiled in conflicts that are not of her choosing, confliets which may eventually overwhelm her or lead her into a futile war.
Also, the husband becomes the de facto mler, and often tries to do away
with his wife the queen, as Damley tried to get rid of Mary. Elizabeth
learned the lesson weH. She had two goals as a mier: to a- -oid marriage and
to avoid war. She managed to combine these goals by t....:ngling the possibility of marriage in order to forge alliances. The moment she committed
to any single suitor would have been the moment she lost her power. She
had to emanate mystery and desirability, never discouraging anyone's
hopes but never yielding.
Through this lifelong game of flirting and withdrawing, Elizabeth
dominated the country and every man who sought to conquer her. As the
center of attention, she was in contro!. Keeping her independence above
all, Elizabeth protected her power and made herself an object of worship.
I would rather be a beggar and single than a queen and married.
Queen Elizabeth I, 1533-1 603
KEYS TO POWER
Since power depends greatly on appearances, you must leam the tricks
that will enhance your image. Refusing to commit to a person or group is
one of these. When you hold yourself back, you incur not anger but a kind
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of respect. You instantly seem powerful because you make yourself ungraspable, rather than succumbing to the group, or to the relationship, as
most people do. This aura of power only grows with time: As your reputation for independence grows, more and more people will come to desire
you, wanting to be the one who gets you to commit. Desire is like a virus: If
we see that someone is desired by other people, 


we tend to find this person
desirable too.
The moment you commit, the magic is gone. You become like everyone else. People will try all kinds of underhanded methods to get you to
commit. They will give you gifts, shower you with favors, all to put you
under obligation. Encourage the attention, stimulate their interest, but do
not commit at any cost. Accept the gifts and favors if you so desire, but be
careful to maintain your inner aloofness. You cannot inadvertently allow
yourself to feel obligated to anyone.
Remember, though: The goal is not to put people off, or to make it seem
that you are incapable of commitment. Uke the Virgin Queen, you need to
stir the pot, excite interest, lure people with the possibility of having you.
You have to bend to their attention occasionally, then-but never too far.
The Greek soldier and statesman Alcibiades played this game to perfection. It was Alcibiades who inspired and led the massive Athenian armada that invaded Sicily in 414 B.C. When envious Athenians back horne
tried to bring hirn down by accusing hirn of trumped-up charges,


 he defected to the enemy, the Spartans, instead of facing a trial back horne. Then,
after the Athenians were defeated at Syracuse, he left Sparta for Persia, even
though the power of Sparta was now on the rise. Now, however, both the
Athenians and the Spartans courted Alcibiades because of his influence
with the Persians; and the Per lans showered hirn with honors because of
his power over the Athenians and the Spartans. He made promises to every
side but committed to none, and in the end he held all the cards.
If you aspire to power and influence, try the Alcibiades tactic: Put
yourself in the middle between competing powers. Lure one side with the
promise of your help; the other side, always wanting to outdo its enemy,
will pursue you as weIl. As each side vies for your attention, you will immediately seem a person of great influence and desirability. More power
will accrue to you than if you had rashly committed to one side. To perfect
this tactic you need to keep yourself inwardly free from emotional entanglements, and to view all those around you as pawns in your rise to the top.
You cannot let yourself become the lackey for any cause.
In the midst of the 1968 U.S. presidential election, Henry Kissinger
made a phone call to Richard Nixon's team. Kissinger had been allied with
Nelson RockefeIler, who had unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination. Now Kissinger offered to supply the Nixon camp with valuable inside
information on the negotiations for peace in Vietnam that were then going
on in Paris. He had a man on the negotiating team keeping rum informed of
the latest developments. The Nixon team gladly accepted his offer.
At the same time, however, Kissinger also approached the Democratic
nominee, Hubert Humphrey, and offered his aid. The Humphrey people
asked hirn for inside information on Nixon and he supplied it. "Look,"
Kissinger told Humphrey's people, "I've hated Nixon for years." 


In fact he
had no interest in either side. What he really wanted was what he got: the
promise of a high-level cabinet post from both Nixon and Humphrey.
Whichever man won the election, Kissinger's career was secure.
The winner, of course, was Nixon, and Kissinger duly went on to his
cabinet post. Even so, he was careful never to appear too much of a Nixon
man. When Nixon was reelected in 1972, men much more loyal to hirn
than Kissinger were fired. Kissinger was also the only Nixon high official to
survive Watergate and serve under the next president, Gerald Ford. By
maintaining a little distance he thrived in turbulent times.
Those who use this strategy often notice a strange phenomenon:
People who rush to the support of others tend to gain little respect in the
process, for their help is so easily obtained, while those who stand back
find themselves besieged with supplicants.


 Their aloofness is powerful, and
everyone wants them on their side.
When Picasso, after early years of poverty, had become the most successful artist in the world, he did not commit hirnself to this dealer or that
dealer, although they now besieged hirn from all sides with attractive offers
and grand promises. Instead, he appeared to have no interest in their services; this technique drove them wild, and as they fought over hirn his
prices only rose. When Henry Kissinger, as U.S. secretary of state, wanted
to re ach dHente with the Soviet Union, he made no concessions or conciliatory gestures, but courted China instead. This infuriated and also scared
the Soviets-they were already politica 11y isolated and feared further isolation if the United States and China_ came together. Kissinger's move
pushed them to the negotiating table. The tactic has a parallel in seduction:
When you want to seduce a woman, Stendhal advises, court her sister first.
Stay aloof and people will come to you. It will become a chalienge for
them to win your affections. As long as you imitate the wise Virgin Queen